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A b s tr a c t
T he notion of contiguous duration dependence is defined and illus­
tra ted  w ith a simple nonstationary job search model where unemploy­
ment spell and accepted job spell durations are stochastically related 
through reemployment earnings. The distribution of both  reemploy­
ment earnings and accepted job durations are analyzed jointly w ith com­
pleted unemployment duration using param etric and semi-parametric 
techniques.























































































































































































The estimation of nonstationary economic models explaining the behavior of 
unemployed individuals seeking reemployment opportunities has raised an enor­
mous interest in recent years.1 In particular, the time variation in unemploy­
ment benefit has been widely studies both theoretically and empirically. It is 
well known that when individuals claim UI benefit for a limited period only, 
their reservation wage decline until benefit termination and individuals escape 
unemployment at an increasing rate. Mortensen (1990) shows that, in a short 
period before exhaustion, the reservation wage may fall sharply.2 Meyer (1990) 
and Hausman (1990) have found a clear presence of spikes in the escape rate out 
of unemployment when benefit lapse. However, given that these studies make 
use of duration data solely, it is virtually impossible to infer whether spikes are 
explained by variations in search efforts as opposed to changes in reservation 
wages. The primary objective of this paper is to remove this oversight.
Thsi paper proposes an analysis of the consequence of nonstationarity 
from an angle which has, so far, been ignored in the literature. The empir­
ical analysis is based on the idea that nonstationarity in reservation wages 
creates a detectable dependence between the completed duration of unemploy­
ment and reemployment earnings. The nonstationarity retained in this paper 
is induced by finite UI benefit entitlement period. By allowing for the pos­
sibility of search activities upon reemployment, nonstationarity in reservation 
wages creates a statistical relationship between completed unemployment dura­
tion and accepted job duration which I call ’’contiguous duration dependence” . 
It has similarities with the notion of ’’lagged duration dependence” commonly 
used in the literature on event histories analysis although the notion of contigu­
ous duration dependence focuses on the dependence between two distinct, but 
consecutive, labor market states occupied by a given individual.
The main contribution of the paper is the analysis of the consequence 
o of nonstationarity on reemployment outcomes (reemployment earnings and ac­
cepted job duration). A special attention is paid to the sensitivity of reem­
ployment earnings and accepted job duration for those individual who escape
'See devine and Kiefer (1991) for a survey.
2Nonstationarity may also be introduced through unemployment duration ’’stigms”. Ex­
amples of stigma include a decline in the arrival rate with elapsed unemployment duration or 



























































































unemployment close to benefit termination to see if spikes in the hazard rate 
out of unemployment are explained by acceptance of lower wages or acceptance 
of jobs likely to be terminated very early. The analysis is applied to a sample of 
young Canadian males who experienced an involuntary separation (layoff) dur­
ing a two-year period (1976-1977) and accepted a new job (recalls are omitted 
from the sample).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section (section 2), the 
notion of contiguous duration dependence is illustrated with a simple nonsta- 
tionary job search model. The empirical specification is discussed in section 
3. Setion 4 is devoted to the presentation of the data while the results are in 
section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I use a simple nonstationary search model in order to illustrate 
the notion of contiguous duration dependence. It is used as a guideline for the 
empirical specification of the reduced-form analysis. The underlying framework 
is as follows. Initially, workers are laid off and are forced to search while unem­
ployed. The value of unemployed search, Vu(ru), is assumed to be a decreasing 
function of unemployment duration ru because individuals are entitled to UI 
benefit for only a finite period. It is assumed that Vu(.) represents the value 
of searching while unemployed taking into account the possibility of searching 
upon reemployment. Once reemployed, workers receive offers randomly (at no 
cost) and accept the first offer above their reemployment wage. We denote the 
value of occupying employment (at re-employment wage w) by Ve(u>)3. It is 
understood that \ 'e(ui) represents the value of remaining employed at a given 
wage rate plus the discounted value of following the best strategy next period; 
that is accepting any offer above w. The escape rate out of unemployment, 
0U(.), is given by
(tu) =  Au {1 -  F (u;*(tu))} (1)
where ru denotes unemployment duration, Au(.) denotes the arrival rate 
while unemployed, F(.) represents the distribution (exogenous) of wage offers
3The value functions are not derived explicitely since the objective is not to estimate a 
structural model. For an example of job search with unemployed and employed search, see van 
den Berg (1992) or Belzil (1996). the effect of human capital loss on reemployment earnings 




























































































and w'(.) represents the reservation wage of the unemployed. The escape rate 
out of the accepted job, 6e{-), is independent from accepted job duration (re), 
that is
6e = \ e { l -F { w )}  (2)
where Ae is the arrival rate while employed and w is the accepted wage. 
Denoting the density of unemployment duration by g(ru), the mean reemploy­
ment wage may be expressed as
E M = mi ?  (£ ° m  { } ,(Tu)dT' <3)
Because both V„(w) and the escape rate out of the accepted job are in­
dependent from job tenure and taking expectation with respect to w whose 
distribution depends on ru through w*(r„), the accepted job conditional sur­
vivor function S(re | ru) is the expected survivor function, that is
S(T* 1 T- ) *  C m~  ( r . ) ) }  <4)
where f(.) is the density of wage offers. This illustrates clearly how past 
unemployment (through reemployment wages) affects accepted job spells dura­
tion. Equation (2.3) establishes the negative relationships between unemploy­
ment duration and reemployment earnings while (2.4) suggests that nonsta- 
tionarity in reservation wages creates a negative relationship between durations 
of contiguous spells of unemployment and reemployment (job). Using event 
history data, my objective is to investigate this dependence using a reduced- 
form model of the joint distribution of completed unemployment duration and 
reemployment outcome (reemployment earnings and accepted job duration).
3 Econom etric Specification
The main purpose of the empirical analysis is to estimate the sensitivity of 
reemployment earnings (eq. 2.3) and accepted earnings (eq. 2.4) to completed 
unemployment duration. For this purpose, separate models for reemployment 




























































































3.1 S im ultaneous M odel o f U nem ploym ent D uration  and 
R eem ploym ent O utcom e
It is assumed that completed unemployment duration tu, measured in weeks, 
depends on a vector of regressors X, containing the initial benefit period (max­
imum benefit duration), benefit level and an intercept term. That is
log tui = X[P +  £m (5)
with
E(eui) =  0 and Var (eui) =  cr\
The specification of the reemployment earnings equation must be con­
sistent with the fact it depends on the value of the reservation wage upon 
acceptance of a new job which itself depends on the duration of unemployment 
up to benefit termination. Given the desire to impose a flexible form for the 
dependence of earnings on unemployment duration (benefit exhaustion) and to 
provide an estimation method as close as possible to a semi-parametric regres­
sion, I do the following. I define the potential entitlement period left upon 
reemployment (A,) as the difference between the initial entitlement period (t?,) 
and the completed duration of unemployment tu, when the difference is posi­
tive and I set it to 0 when it is negative (that is when the individual accepted 
reemployment beyond exhaustion), that is
A, =  i?t -  tm if 0, - t u i> 0
Ai = 0 if -  tui < 0 
I then define a set of variable 6{ such that
% =  1 if j < Aj < j  + 1  
S{ =  0 if not
for j=l,3,5,...25. Those who have exhausted their benefit are identified 




























































































6° = 1 if tUi > i?i 
<5,° =  0 if not
The group of individuals who have left unemployment with a potential 
entitlement period of 27 weeks or more are taken as the reference group. The 
unemployment duration (benefit exhaustion) outcomes are grouped by periods 
of two weeks so that the number of regressors (binary variables) remains man­
ageable. The reemployment earnings equation can therefore be expressed as
log Wi = Z'a  + £wt (6)
where
£(e>«) =  0 and Var (ewi) =  a l
and where Z is a column vector which contains an intercept term, previous 
labor market experience (representing the effect of accumulated human capital) 
excluded from the unemployment duration equation and 14 binary variables 6J 
for j=0,l,3,...25. The same principle may be applied to the analysis of accepted 
job duration, tc, that is I can define the following equation
logtei =  Z'T + e* (7)
with
E{£ei) =  0 and Var (eei) =  a\
Clearly, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated across 
states, 3.1/3.2/3.3 define a non-linear simultaneous system with limited depen­
dent variable4. Furthermore, the composition of X and Z ensures identification. 
Therefore, equations 3.1 and 3.2 and, subsequently, 3.1. and 3.3. may be es­
timated by maximum likelihood techniques if I assume that the error terms 
are multivariate normal with covariance auw and aue. The joint estimation of 
(teiw ,tu) would have little interest since accepted job duration and accepted 
earnings are just alternative ways of looking at the reemployment outcome. It 
is also clear that te and w must depend logically on the same regressors. So 
a joint reduced-form model of (tu,iu,te) would run into serious identification 
problems.
4A similar model specification is used in Belzil (1995,a) in order to estimate the effect of 




























































































3.2 Sem i-param etric A nalysis
Although the simultaneous system is quite promising (it tackles simultaneity 
caused by unobserved heterogeneity), it also has some weaknesses. First, log 
normality constitutes a strong restriction of the baseline hazard. A survey of the 
recent empirical literature concerned with economic duration data reveals the 
importance of using models where either the baseline hazard or the unobserved 
heterogeneity term are allowed to be estimated non parametrically. To evalu­
ate the robustness of the results, equation 3.3 has been reestimated ignoring 
endogeneity.5To do so, I use the semi-parametric method proposed by Han and 
Hausman (1990). Their method of estimation, based on the regression specifi­
cation implied by the proportional hazards specification, involves maximization 
of an ordered discrete choice model where the categories are the actual discrete 
failure times generated by a continuous duration random variable. Denoting 
continuous job duration by re and letting Z denote the set of covariates defined 
earlier, the hazard function h(.) is assumed to be
where ho(.) denotes the baseline hazard and t] denotes a vector of param­
eter to be estimated. The model admits a regression interpretation in terms of 
the log integrated hazard, that is
for t=l,2,..T. T denotes the number of discrete time intervals considered. 
Note that given 3.5, a positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the covari­
ate reduces the hazard rate and therefore increases duration. The probability 
that the accepted job will be terminated in month t, denoted P^, is given by
where f(.) is the extreme value density. For right censored observations, 
the probability that a failure takes place beyond period t for individual i, de­
noted Pa, is given by
5Actually, the results (presented in section 5) have indicated weak evidence that the unob­
served factors affecting unemployment duration are correlated with those unobserved factors 
affecting accepted job duration.





























































































f “ = C z : , fJ S t-Z 'J
The log likelihood is simply given by
N
Kv) =  [ci log Pit +  (1 -  Ci) log Pit
t=l t
(10)
where dit =  1 if the observed job duration is in month t and 0 if not and 
Cj =  1 for completed observations and 0 for censored spells.
4 The D ata
The models are estimated from a panel of Canadian labor force participants 
which is extracted from the Longitudinal Labor Force File of Employment and 
Immigration Canada. The data are constructed as an event history data set 
and covers a period going from January 1972 until December 1984 and contains 
several pieces of information about employment and unemployment spells of 
a random sample of Canadian labor force participants. The data are actually 
based on a merge of several administrative files such as Records of Employment 
and the Unemployment Insurance administrative files and they enable the re­
searcher to recreate the sequence of labor market states occupied by a given 
individual. The Records of Employment identify the reason for separation and 
provide information about job tenure, age, experience and industry .6The Un- 
employent Insurance file, along with some partial income tax records file, gives 
information about potential benefit duration for the unemployed, weekly earn­
ings, unemployment duration, UI benefit level and the number of weeks of 
benefit entitlement left when a new job is accepted. The employer code avail­
able is used to identify individuals who have been laid off and returned with 
the same employer subsequently. The original data set contains an impressive 
number of observations but only a sub-sample, ensuring a reasonable level of 
homogeneity across individuals, has been used.
The first selection criteria was the occurrence of a layoff covered by Un­
employment insurance between January 1976 and December 1977. The job
6The data set is actually described in Belzil (1995a, 1995b and 1996). Ham and Rea (1987) 




























































































separation had to be followed by acceptance of a new job (in order to elim­
inate temporary layoffs). The sample contains 823 males (aged 24 or less at 
the time of the layoff) who remained in the labor force for the remaining of 
the period covered by the data. The sample contains actually 430 accepted 
job durations which were later terminated by a layoff and 294 job durations 
terminated by a quit.7 As I look only at young males whom are well known to 
have a high turnover rate, only 12% of the reemployment job spells (99) had 
not been terminated by the end of the sample survey. Note that for these 99 
observations, reemployment earnings are unknown, this explains the smaller 
sample size when reemployment earnings are analyzed (as opposed to accepted 
job durations), the data set is also particularly convenient since it also enables 
to capture exogenous variations in the individual benefit entitlement period 
(because of legislation changes taking place in 1977). Some sample summary 
statistics are found in tablel.
7With administrative data, it is quite difficult to collect information on individuals who 
become non-participants. Among all individuals experiencing a layoff during this period, only 
7% have actually left the accepted job to leave the labor force. However, as this information 
is actually estimated from the existence of subsequent employment records, this number can 




Previous Earnings (current dollars) 
Duration of unemployment (weeks) 
Potential Benefit Period (weeks) 
Unemployment Benefits (dollars) 
Accepted Earnings (current dollars) 
Duration of Accepted job (weeks)





































































































In this section, the main results are presented. The results obtained when 
unemployment duration and reemployment earnings are analyzed jointly are in 
section 5.1 Those concerned with the joint distribution of excepted job durations 
and unemployment durations are in section 5.2
5.1 U nem ploym ent D urations and R eem ploym ent Earn­
ings
The first step of the analysis consists in the joint estimation of equations 3.1 
and 3.2 using maximum likelihood techniques. The results are found in Table 
2. The first two variables, log benefit level and log maximum benefit duration 
are part of the unemployment duration equation. The results indicate that 
higher level of benefit and longer benefit duration raise unemployment dura­
tion. The parameter estimates are .2114 and .2916 respectively and they admit 
an elasticity interpretation. These are standard results. The effect of benefit 
level is however not very precisely estimated. It is also found that experience 
raises reemployment earnings (the coefficient is .0346 with a t-ratio of 2.45). 
The set of binary variables representing the time until benefit termination at­
tracts most interest. Because the reference group is composed of those who left 
unemployment early (with 27 weeks or more of benefit remaining), the param­
eter estimates are therefore expected to be negative around exhaustion (0 to 4 
weeks) and closer to 0 as we move toward the last group (25-26). The results 
are consistent with what is expected; there is a clear evidence of a decrease 
in reemployment earnings as individuals approach exhaustion. The parameter 
estimates range from -1.43 around benefit termination to .03 (insignificant) for 
those leaving unemployment the period next to the reference group. Finally, the 
covariance between the error terms (auw) is not very precisely estimated so the 
null hypothesis of independence between earnings and unemployment durations 





























































































5.2 A ccepted  Job D uration  and U nem ploym ent D ura­
tion
The model presented in section 2 predicts that a decrease in reservation wages 
should be mirrored by acceptance of jobs likely to be terminated by the worker. 
To verify this, the simultaneous model (equations 3.1 and 3.3) has been esti­
mated jointly. The likelihood is in 3.4 and the results in table 3. There is no 
notable change for the coefficient associated to benefit level, benefit duration 
and experience. Given the definition of the binary variables introduced earlier, 
it is now possible to apply the analysis made with reemployment earnings to 
accepted job durations. Furthermore, like in the case of reemployment earnings, 
negative coefficients are expected around exhaustion since unemployed individ­
uals accepting job around benefit termination are more likely to quit these jobs. 
The parameter estimates show indeed that it is the case. Coefficients are nega­
tive around benefit termination (-.80) and are close to 0 (.02 for the group next 
to the reference group). Interestingly, the estimated covariance between both 
error terms (<7ue) is positive but particularly insignificant.
It is now natural to reestimate 3.3 using the semi-parametric method pro­
posed by Han and Hausman (1990) and ignoring endogeneity. To do so, 12 
interval of one months have been chosen so that the number of parameter to 
be estimated remains reasonable (14 binary variables for exhaustion have also 
to be estimated). The results are in table 4. The resulting parameter estimates 
show a tendency similar to the one obtained with the simultaneous system (they 
range from -.62 to .01) although the parameters cannot be compared readily. 
Nevertheless, given the weak evidence of endogeneity between completed un­
employment duration and reemployment job duration, this is not surprising.8
Finally, given that the search framework of Section 2 predicts that un­
employment duration and accepted job duration are connected only through 
accepted earnings, this hypothesis can be tested by including both accepted 
earnings and unemployment duration in the accepted job duration model. The 
results, in Table 5, indicate that once accepted earnings are taken into account 
(they have a strong positive effect on job duration), unemployment duration 
(introduced using the flexible functional form discussed earlier) is practically
8The semi-parametric estimation of the hazard function revealed that job durations have 
high termination rates in the first 2 or 3 months and that the termination rate tend to decrease 
thereafter to remain relatively flat. This might be explained by the fact that individuals 





























































































uninformative. This is verified by a likelihood ratio test for the null that all 
parameters associated to unemployment duration classes are equal to 0 (see 
footnote in table 5).
6 Conclusion
The sensitivity of the escape rate out of unemployment to benefit duration is 
usually documented by the presence of spikes around benefit termination. In 
this paper, I have analyzed the re-employment implications of nonstationar- 
ity in job search using two measures of reemployment outcome; reemployment 
earnings and the waiting time until the worker quits the accepted job. It has 
been found that accepted job tenure and reemployment earnings are negatively 
correlated with completed unemployment duration and that much of the nega­
tive relationship between reemployment outcomes and unemployment duration 
is explained by the fact that they are sensitive around benefit termination.
This is interesting since the sensitivity of reemployment outcomes is found 
at a point where, in general, spikes in the escape rate out of unemployment are 
also found. To a large extent, the empirical results found in this paper may 
indicate that spikes in the escape rate out of unemployment are mirrored at 
reemployment by a sharp decline in reemployment earnings and acceptance of 
jobs from which voluntary separation is likely. It has also been found that 
the connection between unemployment and accepted job durations comes from 





























































































Belzil, Christian (1996) ’’Relative Efficiencies and Comparative Advantages in 
Job Search” Journa l of Labor Economics, 14 (1).
Belzil, Christian (1995,a) ’’Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment 
Over Time: An Analysis with Event History Data” T he Review of Eco­
nomics and S tatistics, April 1995, 113-126.
Belzil, Christian (1995,b) ’’Unemployment Duration Stigma and Reem­
ployment Earnings” T he C anadian Journal of Economics, 28 (3), :568- 
587.
Devine, Theresa and Kiefer, Nicholas M. (1991) Empirical Labor eco­
nomics: The Search Approach. Oxford University Press, New York.
Han, Aaron and Hausman, Jerry (1990) ’’Flexible Parametric Estimation 
of Duration and Competing Risk Model” . Journal of Applied Econom et­
rics, 5, :325-353.
Ham, John and Rea, Samuel (1987) ’’Unemployment Insurance and Male 
Unemployment Duration in Canada” , Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (3):325- 
53.
Meyer, Bruce (1990) ’’Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells”, 
Econom etrica, 58 (4): 757-782.
Mortensen, Dale (1990) ” A Structural Model of UI Benefit Effects on the 
Incidence and Duration of Unemployment” in Yoram Weiss and G. Fishelson, 
Advances in the Theory and Measurement of Unemployment, Macmillan, Lon­
don.
van den Berg, Gerard (1990) ’’Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory”, 
Review of Economics Studies, 57 (2): 255-77.
van den Berg, G. (1992) ” A Structural Dynamic Analysis of Job Turnover 






























































































Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Model : Unemployment Duration and Reemployment Earnings











































































































































Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Model : Unemployment Duration and Accepted Job Duration
Variables Param (t-ratio) Variables Param (t-ratio)
Benefit Level 
(log)
.1916 19-20 .05 
(1.76) (1.20)
Init. Benefit .3004 21-22 -.03
Period (log) (2.32) (.74)
Experience .0304 23-24 -.02 
(2.04) (.41)
Weeks to Exhaustion 25-26 .02
(.54)
0*« -. 80 <r 1.05
U
(2.24) (5.36)
1-2 -.84 a .91
e
(3.01) (6.12)
3-4 -.70 a .21
ue
(2.24) (1.49)
5-6 -.27 Sample Size 823 
(1.09)
7-8 -.25 Log Likelihood -1034.4 
(1.27)







































































































Semi-Parametric Method (Han and Hausman) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Model : Accepted Job Duration


































































































































Semi-Parametric Method (Han and Hausman)
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Model : Accepted Job Duration (Accepted Earnings Included) 








































» Asymptotic t-ratios are in bracket.
** A reestimation of Table 5 without unemployment duration variables gives a 
log likelihood of -1037.3, so the likelihood ratio test for the null that all 
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